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O
ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC DEBT
Firstly, we focus on the sustainability issues of
public debt. We proceed to discuss the Ponzi
game related to government debt. Finally, with
a view to providing more insight into public
debt scenarios for the coming years, we present
the demographic implications of ageing.
In modern states it is not uncommon that
public expenditures exceed revenues, thereby
generating deficits. The deficit is typically
financed by borrowings (bond issues), which
leads to the accumulation of government debt.1
It may sound surprising, but most core
issues of government debt started to crop up in
economic thinking centuries ago. Nonetheless,
economists are yet to come up with a common
position in respect of the role and size of pub-
lic debt. In one area, however, there is general
consensus. Namely the area of sustainability.
Be its debt ratio high or low, a country should
strive to avoid putting the debt-to-GDP ratio
on a growth path by any means, as this could
set off a debt spiral and eventually lead to
national bankruptcy or forced adjustment.
Therefore, before turning to demographic
aspects, we need to address the issue of sus-
tainability.
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On a global scale debt ratios could be very
different; in fact, they show a rather diverse
picture in terms of chronology as well. During
the previous centuries only war-ridden periods
produced markedly high debt ratios. For exam-
ple, in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the
debt ratio of the United Kingdom reached 260
percent,2 and rose to a similar level after World
War II as well.3 In times of peace debt-to-GDP
ratios tended to be much lower; however, they
demonstrated steady growth following World
War II. Previously, only periods of war saw debt
ratios similar in magnitude to those observed
following the current crisis.
The basic starting point in defining the sus-
tainability of the debt ratio is the size of deficit
or primary balance under which the public debt
to GDP ratio can be sustained. According to
the simplest correlation,4
(1)
where d is the deficit ratio of the central gov-
ernment, b is the debt ratio, while y indicates
the nominal GDP growth rate.
The formula clearly demonstrates the rela-
tionship between the evolution of the public
debt ratio and the growth rate, as well as the
deficit ratio. Based on the criterion of sustain-
able debt ratio () it is simple to arrive at a cor-
related equilibrium:5
(2)
Breaking down the fiscal balance into pri-
mary balance and interest expenditures yields
the following correlation:
(3)
where i is the nominal interest rate charged on
debt, which establishes a relationship between
total outstanding debt as of the beginning of the
year and intra-year interest payments, while pb
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The sustainability criterion is calculated as
follows:
(4)
These correlations may be expressed with
real variables as well:
(5)
where r is the real interest rate charged on
debt, while g designates the real growth rate
The correlated equilibrium, in turn, can be
described as:
(6)
This formula may be recognised as  pb=b
H(r–g), albeit in a slightly inaccurate form
Accordingly, changes in the initial public
debt ratio determine the evolution of the debt
ratio. It is clear from this arithmetic that even a
relatively minor change in the relationship
between the interest rate and growth or in the
primary expenditures could easily instigate a
shift to a substantially higher debt ratio
(Feldstein, 2004). While it is possible to sustain
high public debt ratios as well, in these circum-
stances the sustainability of the country as a
whole can be jeopardised even by the slightest
changes in interest rate and growth conditions
(see Erdõs, 2000).
Thus, the main conclusions of the sustain-
ability equations are the following:
•  the relationship between (real) interest
rates and (real) growth is important,
• the initial value of the debt ratio is a funda-
mental determinant: a high level of initial
debt amplifies the effects of the correla-
tions between real interest and real growth,
•  since interest rates and growth tend to
fluctuate – in response to not only inter-
nal, but also to external effects – a path
which earlier appeared sustainable could
suddenly become unsustainable,
•  this latter effect is all the more pro-
nounced with a high initial debt ratio level.
The relationship between interest rates and
growth deserves mention in its own right.
When modelling debt paths, it is frequently
assumed – based on the experiences of certain
countries – that the rate of economic growth
exceeds the real interest rate6, which almost
automatically suggests that the specific country
is likely to “outgrow” its national debt and
avoid a debt crisis. However, the general eco-
nomic situation is far from being this clear-cut.
REAL INTEREST, ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND THE PONZI GAME – DOES DEBT
HAVE TO BE REPAID?
What does the theory suggest?
In the standard neoclassical growth model
interest (r) is the marginal product of capital,
whereas economic growth (g) depends on pop-
ulation growth and technical advancement.
Whether the economy has reached a steady
state of dynamic efficiency depends on the
relationship of these two factors (r and g). All
this will have an impact on the possible roles of
government spending and public debt. If r > g,
then the economy has reached dynamic effi-
ciency in the sense that there is no room for a
Pareto improvement. In this scenario the con-
dition for future consumption growth is a cur-
rent increase in the saving rate, which, in turn,
boosts investment projects. All this, however,
assumes a decline in current consumption. In a
situation like this, the economy has insufficient
capital to achieve the steady state consistent
with the golden rule7 of capital accumulation.8
Under these circumstances, the overspending
of the government and the crowding out effect
of public debt slacken growth and, accordingly,
efficiency is not improved in the Pareto sense.
In contrast, if r < g, then, according to stan-
dard growth models, the economy failed to
achieve dynamic efficiency as it has overaccumu-
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lated capital.9 This scenario allows for a Pareto
improvement, and the deceleration of capital
accumulation may potentially increase both cur-
rent and future consumption (see Mankiw –
Elmendorf, 1998; Cahuc, 2009–2010).10
What happens to debt developments, then,
when r < g? In this case, a Pareto improvement
is theoretically achievable. This also suggests
that the efficiency of the economy may be
improved by a Ponzi scheme run by the gov-
ernment.11
What is the government’s Ponzi game?
– On the deferability of taxation
According to the theory of the influential
economist, Minsky, the Ponzi game is a debt
financing method whereby payments on prin-
cipal and interest are regularly made from
new loans rather than from the profits
realised from the investment which the origi-
nal loan was intended to finance.12 This
implies that loans are never really paid back;
the repayment of debt and interests can be
deferred interminably. Government debt is
particularly interesting from this perspective,
as the fact that it involves succeeding genera-
tions makes the situation more intricate. In
this regard, the question is whether the state
can permanently finance its spending without
entailing additional tax payments in the
future. In other words, can it finance its cur-
rent spending in such a way that it does not
have to be offset by future tax payments, i.e.
it does not have to pay either interest or prin-
cipal from tax payments. If so, then debt and
the debt burden can be rolled over to the next
generation and the Ponzi scheme can be run.
Since generations follow one another, each
generation can pass debt payment on to the
next generation.
Ricardian equivalence (RE) is an intriguing
approach that is also worth mentioning.13
According to this approach, economic agents
assume that the current fiscal deficit translates
into future taxes. It may be argued, however,
that the state will never really have to repay its
debt if it can finance it by borrowings and roll
it over through refinancing. For example, if its
tax reductions result in fiscal deficit, it can
postpone its future debt burden by rolling it
over to successive generations ad infinitum.
According to Mankiw –  Elmendorf,
Ricardian equivalence could hold true even if
governments never actually pay back their
debt. Indeed, in terms of debt financing, they
distinguish between two scenarios: 
• in the first case, they still pay the interest
charged on the debt by offsetting it with
increased tax burdens (i.e. with primary
revenues), 
• in the other case, however, even the inter-
est on debt is financed from borrowings. 
In the latter instance, they even the interest
is paid from new loans. The authors call this the
“real” Ponzi scheme.14 This is the pilot scheme
where old investors are paid from the money of
new investors. If the government runs this
scheme, its debt will be increased by interest
and the initial tax cut will not entail any future
tax burden increase. This situation does not
imply Ricardian equivalence. Maturing debt is
refinanced and the interest is paid from new
loans.
We will now explore how the Ponzi game
relates to sustainability issues. 
The possibilities and effects of a gov-
ernment’s Ponzi game
It is an important issue,
• whether debt can be rolled over ad infini-
tum, and whether the Ponzi game can be
played indefinitely,
• what happens if r>g and r is lower than the
g growth rate. FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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On the government’s rational Ponzi game
Based on the above we can conclude that,
according to theoretical models, debt can be
rolled over interminably, i.e. when the interest
rate is lower than the growth rate, i.e. (g > r),
it is possible to run a Ponzi game. This is what
is known as an economically rational Ponzi
game run by the government. In this situation
the state can issue and roll over debt indefinite-
ly, without having to repay the debt (i.e. the
principal) or pay the relevant interest.15 This
implies that debt can be increased without
increasing the debt burden. According to theo-
retical models, at this point the economy is in a
state of dynamic inefficiency and overaccumu-
lation. Saving can be reduced by increasing
debt. In the absence of a crowding out effect a
Pareto improvement can be achieved. In this
case debt is increased by rdB; however, based
on (5) the debt ratio converges to zero16
(Blanchard – Weil, 2002; Wigger, 2007, p. 9).
The question is whether the fiscal Ponzi
game can be really played forever under this
scenario? What do the developers of the model
(BEM: Ball – Elmendorf – Mankiw, 1995) think
about it? It is worth giving a detailed presenta-
tion of their important research result. When
they examined the relationship of r and g over
the long term (for the period of 1871 – 1992),17
they found that on average, 1+r/1+g was
smaller than 1 throughout the period as a
whole (and in several sub-periods as well) and
accordingly, the Ponzi scheme was clearly 
successful on average by historical standards.
While the probability of the game’s success
somewhat depends on the specificities of the
historical periods, the situation is unambiguous
in the period following the Second World 
War, at least in terms of the (r–g) value and
volatility.
Ball – Elmendorf – Mankiw distinguish the
Ponzi scheme from the Ponzi gamble. A Ponzi
scheme can be run forever; the government
issues a transfer to one generation when it is
young and subsequently does not levy addi-
tional taxes on any generation on this account.
By contrast, the Ponzi gamble is a Ponzi
scheme with an escape clause. Namely, if the
debt becomes too large, taxes are levied to
reduce it after all. A Ponzi gamble succeeds if
this never happens, i.e. taxes are never raised
due to a current increase in expenditures, while
it fails if taxes must be ultimately raised.
The authors claim that, even under a suc-
cessful Ponzi gamble, an economic policy based
on public debt accumulation reflects insuffi-
ciently prudent conduct. They emphasise that
the  government is nevertheless involved in a
gamble, because there is always a chance, albeit
small, that the Ponzi game of its making will
fail. Eventually, future generations will have to
foot the bill in the form of higher taxes for the
lavish spending of past generations.18 Another
important conclusion of the authors is that a
Ponzi gamble is much riskier from an ex ante
perspective than it is viewed ex post. Abel
(1992) examined expected (ex ante) changes in
public debt ratio in more detail, providing fur-
ther insight into the debate on the rationality
of the Ponzi game. The author set out to
demonstrate that in an uncertain world, future
developments in economic growth are also
shrouded in uncertainty. Under these circum-
stances, even when g > r holds true there is a
possibility that the expected debt ratio is set on
a growth path (see Table 1).
What causes the low interest rate levels?
We have demonstrated above that the USA saw
interest levels below the growth rate over a
long-term historical period, which rendered the
Ponzi game feasible even by historical stan-
dards. However, this is far from the case with
the general economic situation. OLG models
typically pertain to closed economies. On a
global level, “such a free lunch is not possible”,
claim  Fischer and  Easterly (1990).Turning to
open economies, however, we can find numer- FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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ous special factors both in the case of large and
small economies, which should be considered
in a globalised world economy with liberalised
capital flow. As regards the USA, we cannot
overlook an important specificity, namely, that
its domestic currency serves as a reserve cur-
rency for other countries. Consequently, such
excess demand for its currency exerts down-
ward pressure on interest rates.19
It may happen even in fast-growing
economies that growth rates are higher than
real interest rates; at the same time, however,
there are important counter-forces at work in
the market, striving to eliminate this differ-
ence. What happens if the growth rate exceeds
the interest level? Households, corporations
and the government alike take up loans, and
since the interest rate charged on the loan is
lower than the growth rate of the economy, a
surplus will remain even after the interest is
paid off (free lunch).20 That encourages all eco-
nomic agents to take up more loans. However,
increased borrowings also increase the debt
level, which drives up real interest rates and
reduces economic growth.21
If consumers prefer current rather than
future consumption, market forces will push
interest rates above the growth rate, thus
lenders must be compensated for relinquishing
their current consumption. “If a rapidly grow-
ing economy attempts to exploit the apparent-
ly favourable debt dynamics by borrowing
excessively, the growth rate will eventually fall
below the real interest rate”, say Fischer and
Easterly.
Accordingly, over a longer time horizon,
favourable interest rates and growth dynamics
tend to be the exception, rather than the rule.
“A prudent assumption on which to base fiscal
policy is that the real interest rate will exceed
Table 1
A GROWING DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO WITH THE INTEREST RATE BELOW 
THE GROWTH RATE
Period 1 2 3
















Expected debt/GDP 0,1000 0,1200 0,1439
assumption: r = 4.7%; GDP will randomly be one of the 2 specified values; expected GDP growth: 10%. growth rate deviation can be +6/–4% due
to the presence of uncertainty
Source: Abel, 1992, p. 13 FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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the real growth rate over the long term”
(Macklem, 1994/5, pp. 4–15).
Indeed, the latest developments support
these arguments (see Table 2). In the last two
decades, interest rate levels below the growth
rate have not been a typical phenomenon on a
global level. The Ponzi game ceased to be feasi-
ble even in the USA.
At the same time, however, Duronelly
(2011) observes Ponzi financing in China in
the 2000s. 
With a view to defining the dynamic steady
state of the economy, a so-called modified
golden rule has been laid down (Escolano, IMF,
2010, p. 9).
(7)  O >0, 
where O= i–y/1+y
This means that theoretically, over the long
term the real/nominal interest rate exceeds the
real growth rate.22 This is known as the No-
Ponzi game condition. The modified golden
rule has practical significance as well. This rule
has been observed in most developed countries
over the past two decades. Based on the IMF’s
study, it is worth using l =1 per cent in practi-
cal calculations.
However, it is also important to examine
which influences may affect individual coun-
tries in a way that would result in a violation of
the golden rule, putting the countries con-
cerned in a position conducive to the sustain-
ability of public debt. 
Firstly, we discuss the case where a closed
economy transforms into an open economy
model. In such cases the capital flow effects can
Table 2
INTEREST RATE – GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL
(geometric averages over the period)
Nominal interest rate Interest rate – growth differential
Nominal Effektive* long-term govern- Effektive* long-term govern-
GDP-growth ment bond yield** ment bond yield**
Germany  (1992–2008)  2,9  5,7 5,1  2,8 2,2
Ireland (1991–2008)  9,3  5,5  5,8  –3,8  –3,5
Greece (1992–2008)  9,1  8,7 9,6 –0,5 0,4
Spain (1995–2008) 7,1 5,8 5,4 –1,3 –1,8
France (1991–2008) 3,6 5,9 5,5 2,3 1,9
Italy (1991–2008) 4,6 7,5 7,0 2,9 2,4
the Netherlands (1991–2008) 5,1 6,4 5,4 1,3 0,3
Austria (1991–2008) 4,1 5,5 5,4 1,4 1,3
Portugal (1991–2008) 6,5 8,0 6,9 1,5 0,4
Finland (1991–2008) 4,1 6,7 6,2 2,6 2,1
Sweden (1995–2008) 4,6 5,3 5,3 0,7 0,7
Inited Kingdom (1991–2008) 5,3 6,8 6,2 1,5 0,9
USA (1991–2008) 5,2 5,9 5,6 0,7 0,3
Japan (1991–2008) 0,8 2,9 2,5 2,2 1,7
Canada (1991–2008) 4,9 8,7 6,2 3,8 1,3
Average    5,2 6,4 5,9 1,2 0,7
Hungary (1999–2009) 8,7 8,0 7,8 –0,7  –0,8
*Interest paid in period t on debt outstanding at the end of year t–1.
**10-year benchmark government bond yield or closest bond yield available
Source: Escolano, J. (2010) p. 9 and own calculations based on data released by the Government Debt Management Agency, the CSO and the MNB FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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be tracked by examining individual countries.
Based on this exercise, the following factors
may point to a favourable growth–interest rate
structure:
The reserve currency role may be relevant
for more developed countries; the reserve cur-
rency means capital inflow and additional
demand, acting as a safe haven (e.g. the USA,
euro) (Feldstein, 2004). A positive externality
of the reserve currency role is that it makes the
servicing of public debt cheaper.
Peripheral countries of developed
economies: interest rate convergence is the
positive external effect of the euro area on the
interest rate level, which implies additional
demand for public debt service.23
Foreign capital inflows may have a positive
effect in developing countries; as long as the
inflow lasts, it reduces the domestic interest
rate level and accelerates growth (Mackellar,
1999), thereby creating favourable conditions
for servicing government debt. However, as
soon as the trend reverses, contrasting develop-
ments take hold. 
In the countries where they exist, the above
circumstances support the sustainability of the
debt path, thus the public debt problem
appears to be more favourable. The question is,
what kind of changes can possibly affect these
processes, and what kind of shifts will be there-
by generated along the debt path. If investors’
confidence is shaken (calling into question the
success of the Ponzi game), the ensuing
increase in the interest rate level (and the decel-
eration of growth) may abruptly deteriorate
the debt path. 
In certain countries domestic developments
may also give rise to interest rates below the
growth rate. This depends on whether the spe-
cific country offers a broad range of securities
and investment options. If a wide variety of
securities is available in a country, the debt
securities of the government are not likely to
be particularly attractive, and they will not
become popular enough to ensure that the gov-
ernment can in all certainty roll over (refi-
nance) its debt. However, it is possible to have
a set of criteria and a securities market environ-
ment in place where conditions support the
refinancing of public debt, the most important
of which are as follows.
The range of available securities is not
wide enough, government debt and govern-
ment papers may become attractive for
investors; so much so, that the yield on 
government securities drops particularly low
relative, for example, to the average return on
capital. In these circumstances investors 
prefer to hold government securities in their
portfolios despite the low yields, which allows
for the rollover (regular refinancing) of debt
(Abel, p. 15).
When investors’ risk aversion is particu-
larly high, market atmosphere may become
conducive to the sale of government papers
even though a broad range of investment
instruments is available. In such cases investors
may be willing to pay rather high premia in
order to hold safe government securities. While
the latter scenario may relate to circumstances
dictated by economic policy, it also conceals
numerous demographic conditions. Indeed,
since risk appetite depends to a large extent on
age, an increase in the ratio of the elderly pop-
ulation will have an impact on the longer-term
trend of risk aversion, and hence, the debt
financing of the country. We will address the
demographic background of public debt servic-
ing in more detail below.
Investors will even be inclined to buy
bonds close to the junk category if the expect-
ed change in the specific paper’s rating may
reward them with a higher yield than the rate of
return (r). In this context
(pt+1 / pt )³ rt , 
where p is the paper’s expected rating and
the left side is the expected rating change.  FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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This is also the basis of bubble formation
(see Obstfeld – Rogoff, 1996). This also helps
explain why investors find the low-yield, long-
term government bonds of developed markets
appealing. Indeed, as long as there is demand
for these bonds, long-term interest rates
decline and the rating of the paper increases.
Consequently, as long as the long-term interest
rate level declines and the paper’s rating
increases, the paper has high and increasing
yield levels. Demand may be sustained by sev-
eral factors, such as its character as a safe haven
currency and the expected yield on the paper
itself. The process may last until the short-term
interest rate increase commences or until the
long-term interest rate drops so low that an
increasing number of investors expect a rever-
sal of the trends, namely, the recovery of long-
term interest rates.
The Minsky-type borrowers, i.e. those
unable to pay either the interest on the debt or
its principal, will take up a new loan to cover
this. The fundamental interest of these bor-
rowers (i.e. the bond issuers) is to see the value
of this instrument (bond) climb continuously,
because they cannot refinance their debt in any
other way. The bursting of the bubbles, in turn,
demonstrates that the wealth (prosperity) sup-
ported by the overspending of economic agents
is nothing but a fake bubble-driven wealth
(“Nouriel Roubini is a Ponzi”. ft.com., 12
March 2009). This is how Ponzi finance and
bubble formation are interrelated. Declining
interest rates may lead to the unusual structure
in which the interest rate level is lower than the
growth rate. This encourages the indebtedness
of states and conceals the fact that amid higher
interest rate levels and slower growth they
would not be able to service their debt. 
This demonstrates that states can run a fiscal
Ponzi scheme for a relatively long time; howev-
er, the risks involved are rather high. The
favourable increases in the interest rate could
easily reverse, at which point public debt
becomes suddenly unsustainable. Bubble for-
mation is a possibility, but bubbles burst soon-
er or later, making it clear that there is no such
thing as a “free lunch” forever.
Is the Ponzi game feasible amid increasing
debt ratios? Visible Ponzi finance
If r is bigger than g, the debt level grows faster
than the economy, therefore – in theory – play-
ing a Ponzi game is not possible. This is the
previously shown No-Ponzi game condition.24
In this context, the growing debt ratio will
some day lead to a future debt service that is
necessarily higher than the total savings. The
young generation will not be able to buy all
government bonds issued, and the government
will not be able to pay interest and principal to
the elderly of the time. The current old gener-
ation was already aware of this in their youth,
thus they did not buy government bonds even
when they were young. Therefore, the govern-
ment faces either bankruptcy, or must raise
taxes in order to service its debt (see
Elmendorf – Mankiw, 1998, Wigger, 2007). In a
broad sense, national bankruptcy may take
place in several forms, such as the downsizing
or refusal of its liabilities, the refusal of debt
repayment, money printing and inflation
fuelling.25 In this situation it is not possible to
provide additional income to one generation
without laying extra burdens on some other
generation. This scenario is not Pareto optimal
as it hurts the interest of a future generation.26
While theoretically this kind of “gamble” can-
not be pursued when the debt ratio is on the rise,
in practice, governments engaged in this “game”
as a matter of course. By 2007, i.e. the period
preceding the crisis, the debt-to-GDP ratio of
developed G20 Member States nearly doubled
from the 40 per cent observed in the early 1980s,
and by 2010 they expected a debt ratio close to
100 per cent.27 During the years of the crisis,
deterioration was particularly severe in Japan
and the Anglo-Saxon countries (see Chart 2). FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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As we have mentioned, several factors result
in the fact that economic participants are will-
ing to buy the bonds of governments involved
in such schemes. However, as we have demon-
strated, this yields dubious results over the
long term for those purchasing the securities;
either their taxes will be raised or public servic-
es will be curbed, or their investment will be
written off. 
The extremely high debt levels currently
observed in developed countries are only com-
parable to those experienced in times of wars
and during the Great Crisis. The question aris-
es whether developed countries are threatened
by a real debt crisis, in other words, whether
they will remain capable of financing and refi-
nancing their current debts in the future. After
the extremely high “wartime” debt levels both
the USA and Great Britain saw a sharp decline
in debt ratios, which confirmed that the world
powers succeeded in “outgrowing” their debts
after periods of crisis. The debt-to-GDP ratio
of the USA following the Second World War
reached levels close to 130 per cent, which then
plunged to around 35 per cent before once
again embarking on a steep rise from the 1980s. 
Let us examine what kind of conditions will
prevail over the long term on a global level in
terms of debt financing, with special consider-
ation to demographic processes. We will exam-
ine what kind of demographic effects will influ-
ence debt financing over the coming decades,
and review the extent to which these trends can
be expected to contribute to – based on his-
toric observations – the reduction of existing,
markedly high debt levels. 
DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC DEBT
In the presentation of demographic effects, our
starting point is the life-cycle model (see
Mosolygó, 2009 for more detail). According to
the life-cycle model, the saving behaviour of
individuals changes throughout their lives.
Typically, the younger generation tends to get
Chart 2 
DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO OF DEVELOPED G20 MEMBER STATES
(%)
Source: IMF, 2009, p. 24. FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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indebted; the active middle-aged age group is
the generation that accumulates substantial
savings, while the older generation is the age
group that typically depletes the accumulated
savings after retirement.
First of all, the question is: who are the
buyers of government securities? According
to macroeconomic models which take stock
of demographic processes, in the models of
generations living together (“overlapping gen-
erations”, OLG)28, government papers are
bought by active individuals (i.e. those work-
ing), for the purpose of building up pension
reserves. Government securities are an alter-
native to shares and other investment instru-
ments. The return on government securities is
generally considered “risk-free”; therefore,
government security yields are lower than
those on risky equity investments. The lower
yield reflects the lower level of risk attached
to government papers, which stems from the
fact that the government’s risk of default is
smaller than that of companies, while govern-
ment bond yields are less volatile than equity
yields. Consequently, risk-averse investors
tend to buy government papers, while those
with a higher risk appetite buy shares.
Therefore, we can also break down the group
of active individuals by age. Younger people
are more inclined to buy shares, while the
older individuals of the active group prefer to
buy government securities. The portfolio
structure of life-cycle savings changes accord-
ing to age; as investors grow older, the share
of government papers increases in their port-
folio.29 Therefore, changes in the growth rate
of the population and hence, the ageing
process, have an impact on the financing
capacity of government securities. Indeed, if
the proportion of active agents – including
that of the elderly – changes, demand for gov-
ernment securities, with all other things being
equal, will change by virtue of demographic
reasons alone.
The impact of baby boomers – 
an OLG model
In our simple OLG model of a closed economy,
three generations live together: the young and
active, the middle-aged and active and the eld-
erly pensioner. The model disregards children.
Active agents work and save. Young actives
account for a negligible part of savings, setting
aside 1 per cent of their income; middle-aged
individuals are the main savers with savings of
9 per cent of their income. For the purpose of
this exercise, of all components of the portfo-
lio, we will concentrate on bonds only and
assume that all savings are invested in bonds.
Economic growth is dependent on the active
population; the growth effects of capital and
technical advancement are disregarded. There
is no inflation; debt, economic growth and sav-
ings are expressed in real terms. The length of
each period is 20 years; therefore, the reviewed
5 periods cover the developments of 100 years.
The analysis is also extended to the govern-
ment. For this purpose, its role is limited to
collecting taxes from the active agents and pay-
ing pensions to the elderly generation. 
Below we set out to model a demographic
scenario which took place in the majority of
developed countries (including the Central and
Eastern European region) following World War
II, also referred to as the ‘baby boom’. The
number of births skyrocketed after World War
II, and started to fall off sharply from the late
1960s.30 This demographic tidal wave then
washed over the second half of the 20th centu-
ry and the beginning of the 21st century. The
1st period of our model is characterised by a
permanent population and a permanent popu-
lation structure. The number of births increas-
es in the 2nd period and falls sharply in the 3rd
period. It is at this point that the birth rate sta-
bilises, albeit at a lower level than before.
Consequently, population growth surges over
the 2nd period and begins to decline gradually FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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from the 3rd period. Eventually, the decline
bottoms out after the 5th period (see Table 3).
The 4th period brings about a fundamental
change in the basic employment situation; this is
when the baby boom generation is set to retire.
Accordingly, the activity rate falls sharply and the
(old age) dependency rate rises. The situation is
aggravated by the fact that the size of the young
population is much smaller than before, thus the
increase in the number of elderly is combined
with a decline in the active population. The orig-
inal employment structure is restored in the 5th
period, at least in terms of the dependent/active
ratio and the saver/spender ratio (see Chart 3).
Chart 3 
CHANGES IN THE DEPENDENCY RATE AND THE ACTIVITY RATE IN THE MODEL
Source: own calculations
Table 3 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF THE BABY BOOM IN A SIMPLE MULTI-GENERATION MODEL 
(number of persons, per cent)
Period 1 2 3 4 5
ages  20–39  100  120 90 90 90
ages  40–59  100 100 120  90  90
ages  60–80  100 100 100 120  90
Total  population  300 320 310 300 270
Population  growth,  %  100 107 97 97 90
Dependency  rate,  %  50 45 48 67 50
Growth of actives, %  100  110  95  86  100
Activity  rate,  %  67 69 68 60 67
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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The population gets younger in the 2nd peri-
od and ages from the 3rd period. The process
accelerates in the 4th period, generating a sud-
den jump in the dependency rate
(elderly/active ratio). The BB generation starts
to retire and the young generation born during
the period of diminished birth rates enters the
labour market.
GDP changes in line with the active popula-
tion (ages 20–59), while savings primarily
depend on the number of people in the 40–59 age
group. Accordingly, Chart 4 and Chart 5 indicate
long-term developments in GDP and savings.
Population structure and saving rates are sub-
ject to fluctuations in each demographic period;
however, they return to their original state in the
5th period. In contrast, the levels (i.e. popula-
tion and GDP levels) do not return to their orig-
inal state after the fluctuations; the population
declines and GDP also stabilises at a lower level.
The chart demonstrates clearly that once the
baby boom generation reaches its saving period
(3rd period), it increases its savings, while after
its retirement (in the 4th period) both savings
and the savings rate fall drastically.
The impact of baby boomers 
on the debt ratio
Below we explore how demographic shock
influences debt trends.  The initial debt level is
a given, and our first assumption is that the
debt level (i.e. real debt) will be maintained; in
a constant demographic environment this also
implies the maintenance of the debt-to-GDP
ratio. On Table 4, however, we can track
decades of changes in the active population
driven by population changes. All this gener-
ates changes in GDP , and leads to the fluctua-
tion of the debt ratio even in the context of
constant real debt levels. With a growing num-
Chart 4 
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN SAVINGS AND GDP COMPARED TO 
THE INITIAL PERIOD 
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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ber of active individuals and in an environment
of economic growth, the debt ratio initially
falls, then later, as the ageing process advances,
it begins gradually to climb. Therefore the baby
boom initially improves the debt position, but
markedly aggravates it as the generation reach-
es retirement. Despite the constant debt level,
the initial 50 per cent debt ratio rises to 56 per
cent. This suggests that a decline in the popula-
tion requires more effort; in order to maintain
the level of the debt ratio, the real debt level
must be reduced (in the 4th and 5th periods the
initial debt ratio can be achieved only with 135
units of debt instead of 150 units).
Let us now examine the dynamics of supply
and demand in the government securities mar-
kets during the different periods. The supply of
government securities is the government debt
itself; in turn, the demand for government
securities is expressed by the bond portfolio
within the savings of households (although
these sizes are obviously identical ex post,31
Chart 5 
SAVING RATE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MODEL
Source: own calculations
Table 4 
BABY BOOM AND DEBT/GDP RATIO IN THE OLG MODEL
Period  1 2 3 4 5
GDP  300 330 315 270 270
Debt/real 150 150 150 150 150
Debt/GDP,  % 0 45 48 56 56
Debt/person 0,50 0,47 0,48 0,50 0,56
Debt/active 0,75 0,68 0,71 0,83 0,83
Debt level stabilising the debt ratio  150  165  158  135  135
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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this does not necessarily hold true ex ante).
Demographic structure and propensity to save
together determine the capacity for security
financing, including the capacity for govern-
ment security financing. Savings are boosted
when the baby boom generation reaches mid-
dle-age and develops a bigger propensity to
save and purchase government papers. Changes
in life-cycle preferences and the demographic
situation lead to changes in saving, and hence,
the demand for bonds.
We assume that in the 1st period public
finances are in equilibrium and the government
strives to maintain the level of real debt. As
Chart 6 indicates, the financing position in
respect of public debt is different in each period. 
The situation is favourable in the 1st, 2nd,
3rd and 5th periods, when the demand for gov-
ernment bonds is adequate thanks to the suffi-
cient level of savings accumulated by the popu-
lation; moreover, these savings are held by the
active middle-aged age group (risk avoiders).
The primary balance is either in a stable equi-
librium, or shows a surplus. The situation is
completely different in the 4th period when the
BB generation retires. The financing position
of public debt deteriorates drastically, and a
large gap opens up between the supply of gov-
ernment bonds (primary deficit) and the
demand thereof (bond savings), at least when
taking account of the changes in demographic
structure only.
Obviously, this market situation will have an
impact on the interest level. It exerts down-
ward pressure on interest rates throughout the
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th periods and drives up
interest rates in the critical 4th period. In any
case, based on the above and with all other
things being equal, the 3rd and 4th periods are
characterised by the following correlations:
r4> r3 and 
g4< g3 
gives the
r3– g3< r4– g4
Chart 6 
BOND MARKET SITUATION BASED ON DEMOGRAPHY
(ex ante assessment)
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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correlation (the indices indicate the specific
periods).
Based on (5) and (7) this also means that,
upon the retirement of the baby boom genera-
tion (4th period), owing to the unfavourable
change in the interest–growth dynamics, a sub-
stantial amount of primary surplus will be
required for the stabilisation of the debt ratio.
Moreover, this has to be achieved in the con-
text of worse growth performance relative to
the previous periods.
Thus, ageing – when the elderly population
drastically increases compared to the size of the
active population – gives rise to lower saving
levels, lower GDP growth rates and higher
interest rates at a time when the primary sur-
plus requirement for the state budget also
increases. Another important lesson to be
drawn from the model is the fact that, in addi-
tion to the dependency rate, the ratio of the
middle-aged generation (ages 40–59) to the
elderly is also of great importance. It is the
responsibility of the saving (middle-aged) gen-
eration to finance public debt, more specifical-
ly, to ensure the refinancing of public debt. The
middle-aged population accomplishes this by
purchasing public debt from the elderly. If the
next generation has less savings than the previ-
ous one, it will have a severe impact on the abil-
ity to finance the debt.
In the 1st, 3rd and 5th periods the debt can
be financed on favourable terms and, in terms
of demand, there is even room for the debt
(and the debt ratio) to grow. Obviously, in
these circumstances there is no obstacle to debt
being rolled over. Both the GDP (g) and the
interest rate level (r) move in a direction that
can easily create the conditions for a Ponzi
game. Therefore, the 1st, 3rd and 5th periods
are highly conducive to the government’s
Ponzi scheme. Debt can be rolled over and
interest can be paid from borrowings.
The situation in the 4th period, however, is
entirely different. Demand for bonds declines
and the debt financing capacity drops below
the debt financing requirement, rendering the
refinancing of public debt uncertain. 
We have previously assumed that the sustain-
ability of debt is ensured by a constant debt
ratio. The change in the demographic situation,
however, may necessitate a reduction of the
debt ratio. Therefore, when the BB generation
retires in the 4th period, the government may
be forced to increase the primary surplus,
which implies that it actually has to repay a
portion of the debt. At this point additional
primary fiscal revenues are required to secure
not only interest payments, but principal
repayment as well. This exerts enormous pres-
sure on the primary balance. In the 4th period
the Ponzi game fails; at this point there are no
more additional savings to ensure the rollover
of debt and to cover interest payments. The
debt pilot scheme eventually collapses; it is pre-
cisely the change in the demographic situation
that renders it impossible to continue.
We will now attempt to examine the effect of
ageing on the primary balance.
Ageing and primary balance: prospects
The surge in the number of elderly persons has
a dramatic effect on the fiscal position of devel-
oped countries. The healthcare, social and pen-
sion expenditures of governments continue to
grow gradually, substantially and inexorably
over the course of the following decades, fore-
shadowing the escalation of primary deficit.
Ageing affects not only developed countries,
but nearly the entire world, the only exceptions
being India, the Near East and African nations.
Based on our multi-generation model, below
we forecast the ageing-induced increases in
debt in developed countries. We assume that
the initial levels of government expenditures
and revenues are in equilibrium, accounting for
20 per cent and 40 per cent of GDP , respective- FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
462
ly.32 Expenditures are limited to those related
to the elderly. During the periods to follow rev-
enues are in line with GDP (i.e. the active pop-
ulation), while expenditures follow changes in
the elderly population.(see Table 5).
Evidently, from the perspective of the debt-
to-GDP ratio, the primary balance observed in
the 2nd and 3rd periods is favourable; however,
it deteriorates substantially over the 4th period.
We also attempted to model the impact of old
age spending on the debt ratio over the same
period. According to the assumption applied in
the model, individual countries gradually reach
the primary deficit characterising the period of
7 and 13 per cent. In addition, we also used two
baseline scenarios in respect of the interest rate
spread and the initial debt level: with r–g=1 per
cent and r–g=3 per cent, the initial debt level is
50 per cent in the first scenario (e.g. the CEE
region) and 100 per cent in the second scenario
(average of G20 Member States in 2010).
As Charts 7 and 8 clearly indicate, over the
next two decades public debt will be subject to
robust growth pressures from the ageing side.
According to the demographic processes, debt
ratios may well double, ceteris paribus, during
the next 20 years, particularly in rapidly ageing
developed countries. 
Obviously, with higher initial levels of old
age spending the effects can be even more dra-
matic than indicated in the chart. If the fiscal
redistribution ratio modelled in the first ver-
sion doubled, the impact of ageing would
translate into the previously mentioned
“wartime” debt ratios (see Table 6).
Accordingly, with all else being equal, the
growing number of the elderly will fundamen-
tally change the basic conditions of debt
financing over the next few years. 
Our model, therefore, clearly demonstrates
that the financing terms of public debt will
drastically deteriorate as a result of the ageing
of the population. In the long run, ageing will
lead to a drastic spike in the debt ratio. Our
model indicates a surge in the financing
requirement amid plummeting financing capac-
ity.
In the previous section we have already
referred to the tensions stemming from the
decline in savings. Given the expected pres-
sures arising from increased expenditures,
these effects are likely to intensify. We may
conclude that the market environment for pub-
lic debt financing will experience a spectacular
turnaround compared to the last few decades.
Over the coming decades, governments will
face volume and price problems on a global
scale in the financing of public debt. In view of
the described market developments it would
not be surprising to see dramatic yield effects
as well. Demography-based yield projections
(e.g. those released by Barclays Capital in
February 2010) forecast long-term US and UK
yields of around 10 per cent by as early as
2020.33 In this regard, it would be a delusion to
surmise that, based on the assumption of capi-
Table 5 
THE IMPACT OF AGEING ON THE PRIMARY BALANCE WITH INITIAL OLD AGE SPENDING 
OF 20 PER CENT
Period  1 2 3 4 5
Primary  expenditure  60 60 60 72 54
Primary  revenue  60 66 63 54 54
Primary  balance  0 6 3  –18 0
Primary   balance/GDP,   %    0 2    1 –7 0
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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Chart 8 
IMPACT OF AGEING ON THE DEBT RATIO UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Note: assuming 40% old age spending
Source: own calculations
Chart 7
THE IMPACT OF AGEING ON THE DEBT RATIO*
* Note: assuming 20% old age spending as a percentage of GDP
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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tal flows (i.e. an open economic model) demo-
graphic effects may be negligible. The bottom
of the demographic wave will reach most devel-
oped countries – along with the most impor-
tant developing countries – almost at the same
time. Thus the demography-based decline in
savings and low financing capacity are global
phenomena, equally affecting open economies
without being notably mitigated by the capital
inflows to emerging markets34 (see Chart 9).
The situation may be further aggravated by
rising yields and by the fact that higher debt
ratios restrain growth. Each element in formu-
la (5) deteriorates and cross effects reinforce
each other. This confirms that our presentation
of the demographic effects was not in the least
exaggerated. Thus each element of the debt
formula points to soaring debt: r–g deteriorates
while pb is on the rise. This will presumably
force governments to introduce radical changes
in economic policy. Undoubtedly, the econom-
ic policy response to the current crisis was to
increase public debt. While this effect repre-
sents a shock in itself, it is negligible compared
to that arising from the demographic processes
over the coming decades (see Table 7).
Economic policies have the possibility to
mitigate the demographic effects in a proactive
Chart 9 
DEMOGRAPHY-BASED BOND YIELD MODELS
Source: Barclays Capital, 2010 
Table 6 
THE IMPACT OF AGEING ON THE PRIMARY BALANCE WITH INITIAL OLD AGE SPENDING
RATIO OF 40 PER CENT
Period  1 2 3 4 5
Primary  expenditure  120 120 120 144 108
Primary  revenue 120 132 126 108 108
Primary  balance  0  12 6  –36 0
Primary balance/GDP, %  0 4 2 –13 0
Source: own calculations FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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Chart 10 
CHANGES IN THE DEBT RATIO AND ITS FORECAST
(weighted with GDP at purchasing power parity)
Source: IMF, 2010 
Table 7 
NET PRESENT VALUE OF DEFICITS ARISING FROM AGEING AND THE CRISIS
Crisis (as a percentage  Ageing (as a percentage  (1)/(1)+(2) (%)
of GDP) (1) of GDP) (2)
Australia 26  482  5,1
Canada 14  726  1,9
France 21  276  7,1
Germany 14 280  4,9
Italy 28 169  14,2
Japan 28  158  15,1
Korea 14  683  2,0
Mexico 6  261  2,2
Spain 35 652  5,1
Turkey 12 204  5,6
UK 9 335  7,9
USA 34  495  6,4
Advances   G20    28    409    4,9
Note: The table presents the estimated effects of the crisis as at the beginning of the crisis; however, the difference in magnitude of the two effects
holds true even after taking into account the developments observed since then.
Source: IMF, 2009 FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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manner. This may involve the extension of the
activity period on one side, and measures to
improve, as soon as possible, the primary bal-
ance on the other side.35
It is also important to see that stepping into
the demographic pothole with a lower debt
ratio will make the stabilisation of a country’s
situation easier: indeed, the increase in r–g has
a more moderate impact on countries with
lower initial debt ratios. Therefore, as regards
the future of debt financing, EM countries fare
better than developed countries as their initial
debt ratios are only a half of the debt ratios of
developed countries. EM countries with high
debt ratios (such as Hungary) are exceptions;
in these countries the greater vulnerability
entailed by the EM position is coupled with a
more severe debt financing problem. Even the
long-term debt prospects of EM countries are
better, partly because of their lower initial debt
ratio and partly because they have a slower age-
ing population compared to developed coun-
tries (see Chart 10).
Moreover, the capital market analysis of the
ageing processes (see Mosolygó 2009, 2010) rais-
es the question of whether there is a link between
the current crisis and the ageing revolution, in
other words, the ongoing retirement of the BB
generation. Indeed, this process reduces the
demand for investment instruments in developed
countries, decreases consumption and savings
and restrains potential growth. At present it is
only a hunch that the current crisis may reflect
the acceleration of the ageing process. However,
it foreshadows long lasting issues and burdens
for the global economy as a whole.
N1t population aged 20 to 39 (youth) in year t
N2t population aged 40 to 59 (middle aged) in year t
N3t population aged 60 to 80 (elderly) in year t
total population in year t
activity rate in year t (active/total population)
dependency rate in year t (retired/active)
growth rate of population in year t
growth rate of active population in year t




































Assumptions and correlations in our OLG model
(in a closed economy and a two-actor model: households-state) FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
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economic growth in year t
production side in year t (a function of the number of active indi-
viduals)
Yt = C1t + C2t + C3t consumption side in year t (a function of consumption)
M1t  youth savings in year t
M2t  middle-aged savings in year t
Mt = M1t+M2t total savings in year t (only the active population saves)
If the tax ratio is W ,
consumption of youth in year t
consumption of the middle-aged in year t
Of which consumption of the elderly in year t
C3t=Yt–C1t–C2t=Yt–(1–W) Yt+Mt=WYt+Mt
In the model W = 1/3
és M1t=0,01 N1t and  youth savings in year t (a function of the number of youth)
M2t=0,09 N2t middle-aged savings in year t (a function of the number of the mid-
dle-aged)
In the absence of inheritance
M1t=B1t, or M2t=B2t all savings are invested in bonds
B1t bond holdings of youth in year t
B2t bond holdings of the middle-aged in year t
Bt =B1t+B2t=Mt total bond portfolio in year t is comprised of the savings of the
active population 
In case of inheritance (our example includes inheritance)
B0 inherited bond portfolio 
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in the model B0=150 in every year 
therefore, in this case
Mt = Bt–B0 savings of the active population and inheritance
savings rate in year t
growth rate of savings in year t
Fiscal correlations
PEt=N3t primary expenditures in year t (old-age pension spending, a func-
tion of the number of the elderly)
PIt=WYt primary revenues in year t (a function of the tax ratio and the num-
ber of active individuals)
Pbt=PIt–PEt primary surplus
Other macroeconomic correlations
Mt=–Pbt fiscal overspending is equal to the savings of the (active) population
In case of a budgetary equilibrium
PIt=PEt
N3t=WYt old-age pension spending is equal to the pension contribution and
If the population structure is constant (ratio of N1t,N 2t, N3t ), the budget will remain in equilib-
rium. Demographic waves, however, have fiscal implications. 
In case of a more rapidly ageing population
the demographic shock upsets the budgetary equilibrium and
C3t=WxYt+(Bt–B0)=WxYt+(Mt1+Mt2)=WxYt–Pbt 
The consumption of the elderly may be increased by the savings of the active population, i.e. the
fiscal deficit above tax revenues. However, this also implies that the consumption of the active
population together with the savings will fall short of their net income.
Income, in turn, will correspond to the sum of fiscal expenditures and the consumption expendi-
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1 Government debt should be distinguished from
the debt accumulated by the private sector (com-
panies, households and banks), as they are differ-
ent in terms of macroeconomic role and impact.
Public debt can be owed to domestic or foreign
lenders and, accordingly, can be categorised as
internal debt and external debt. A country’s debt is
generally comprised of the external debt of domes-
tic stakeholders (the state and the private sector).
Henceforth, our analysis will be limited to the debt
accumulated by the state.
2 “Either the nation must destroy public credit, or
public credit will destroy the nation”, Hume
warned in 1742. He thought that the way out of
public debt could be fairly destructive. The col-
lapse could occur through “natural death” (the
declaration of national bankruptcy) or “violent
death”, when the required expenditure cuts render
the most important functions of the state (such as
defence) impossible to execute, which may play the
country into foreign hands (see also Inzelt, 2008).
Nonetheless, England eventually managed to over-
come its enormous debt burden without major
repercussions.
3 Source: UK National Debt Charts=www.ukpublic
spending.co.uk
4 Stock data pertain to the end of the year. Our sim-
ple model disregards segniorage and foreign
exchange rate effects as well.
5 We may recognise this correlation in a simpler,
albeit slightly inaccurate, form: d = by This simple
correlation serves as a basis for the 3 per cent
deficit requirement of the EU, which is calculated
on the basis of an assumed 5 per cent nominal
growth and the targeted 60 per cent debt ratio.
6 In this case, the real interest rate is the risk-free
rate charged on the debt. For a detailed interpreta-
tion of real interest, see Wigger, 2007
7 Reference is made here to the golden rule of
growth theory. In growth theory, consumption can
be maximised alongside a growth path where the
marginal product of capital equals the growth rate
of the economy, i.e. r=g. This is called the golden
age growth path.
8 In this situation an increase in the saving rate may
lead to an expansion of investment projects; how-
ever, this assumes a decline in current consump-
tion. This is a prerequisite for future consumption
growth. In such a scenario there is no room for a
Pareto improvement.
Underlying demographic factors of the debt path forecast
If the real interest is r, the debt ratio in the 20th year will be
where r–g is granted.
the debt ratio in year t
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9 When the economy accumulates too much capital,
current investment projects – which also imply the
foregoing of current consumption – exceed the
future sacrifice, which is manifested in the moder-
ation of future consumption. Therefore, it is not
worth giving up current consumption, i.e. the cur-
rent capital accumulation is not worth the sacrifice.
The interest rate, which is lower than the econom-
ic growth rate, suggests that this is the situation we
are currently experiencing (Abel, 1992, pp. 8–9).
10 In this case the saving rate declines. “Starting with
too much capital relative to the level defined by
the Golden Rule means that, in transition to the
Golden Rule steady state, consumption is higher
at all points in time than the initial level.”
(Mankiw, 2005, p. 128).
11 According to Mankiw – Elmendorf, while a Ponzi
game leading to a Pareto improvement might be
an interesting possibility, it has no practical rele-
vance to the analysis of debt and growth develop-
ments in the USA and other economies. Indeed,
most economists do not believe that excessive lev-
els of savings would push interest rates below
growth rate levels (Mankiw – Elmendorf, 1998).
12 In Hungary this is also known as a pilot scheme.
For more detail, see: Minsky, 1992. While the
Ponzi game, the pilot scheme and the pyramid
scheme are often considered synonymous, there
are slight differences between them.
13 According to the theorem known as Ricardian
equivalence, the current generation saves the pro-
ceedings from the overspending of the govern-
ment on the assumption that the state intends to
increase its future tax revenues to finance public
debt. Therefore, it is not possible to pressure pri-
vate individuals to spend more by increasing pub-
lic expenditures.
14 In the original approach, even the first case is a Ponzi
game, since the principal is not paid back (ever).
15 In this instance r indicates the risk-free interest
rate charged on public debt.
16 In this case the overspending of the state crowds
out the dynamically inefficient economy’s overac-
cumulation of capital, rather than the capital accu-
mulation of the private sector (Blanchard – Weil,
2002). Pareto suboptimality is a sufficient condi-
tion for the feasibility of Ponzi games. Indeed,
given the imperfections of the market, uncertain-
ty, asymmetric information and the existence of
transaction fees open up the possibility for Ponzi
games and the state’s debt financing.
17 In this context, r indicates the long-term interest
rate on government securities.
18 It should be noted that in this particular analysis
MEB presented, as early as 1995, precisely the
same developments that were observed in the
wake of the current crisis, i.e. the role of low-
probability developments with significant impli-
cations (fat tail problem).
19 The overwhelming majority of analyses and
research are conducted in the USA and they main-
ly respond to problems arising in the North
American economy. Other countries tend to adopt
the same models, albeit with different levels of
revision Nevertheless, these versions may inadver-
tently retain certain assumptions that apply only
to specific countries in special situations. We teach
from American books citing American references.
20 Foreign currency lending had the same effect in
the CEE region: by artificially pushing down
interest rates, it changed the relationship between
the interest rate level (r) and income generation
(disposable income) even within the private sec-
tor. For a while, the process concealed the real
burdens of indebtedness.
21 As regards open economies, this process takes
place slightly differently. The domestic interest FOCUS ON DEBT AND ASSETS 
471
rate level does not rise necessarily, since the inflow
of foreign capital exerts downward pressure on
interest rates. Against this background, however,
foreign debt increases parallel to domestic indebt-
edness.
22 In a simplified form this corresponds to i–y and
r–g, and in this study we generally refer to it as
such henceforth.
23 In certain peripheral EMU Member States (Spain,
Greece and Ireland) the normality rule did not
hold true. In addition, our own calculations indi-
cate that, over the past decade, the golden rule on
debt did not prevail in Hungary either.
24 This is the general assumption of macroeconomic
models. With this they deny the operation of the
Ponzi game at the outset. Consequently, the
analysis of bubbles, which have the same roots as
the Ponzi game, was relegated to the background
(see Obstfeld – Rogoff, 1996).
25 See for example Abel, 1992, p. 7.
26 It is important to realise that this is a very inter-
esting situation. Based on the explanations dis-
cussed above, this Ponzi game is a theoretical
impossibility. In point of fact, however, this is the
really “visible” Ponzi. The debt ratio is clearly on
the rise, making it obvious that Ponzi financing is
at work; in other words, loans are used to finance
debt service (together with a part of current
expenditures). Interest on the debt and the princi-
pal are paid from new credit.
27 “Despite the scientific paradigm shift of the
1970s, the role of the state did not diminish; in
fact, its weight increased spectacularly relative to
its already very high levels”. Muraközy, 2010, p.
784.
28 See also Szabó, 1998, Simonovits, 2002.
29 The ‘target rate’ portfolios used by insurance
companies and pension funds determine the port-
folio structure on the basis of age.
30 In the USA, for example, at the peak of the baby
boom the number of births exceeded the births
recorded for the previous and the subsequent
periods by 40 and 50 per cent, respectively. Our
own assumption implies a fluctuation of 20–25
per cent, which does not appear to be extreme
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